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This article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of real estate-
related taxes that might be imposed in mainland China, in light of the 
government’s needs for tax revenue and the economy’s need for incentives 
to develop land.  Some policy recommendations are presented, based on 
an analysis of real estate taxation in general and of China’s specific needs.  
As one recent article has noted, understanding how behavior adjusts in 






China, Public Finance, Real Estate Taxation. 
 
 
Introduction: Why China Presents an Interesting Case 
 
Industrial growth and the beginnings of private property rights have brought 
China into the realm of modern economies; China has posted impressive 
growth in the course of its movement to a more market-oriented system.  
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While fixed investment, foreign direct investment, and real gross domestic 
product have actually fallen in recent years in Russia, they have greatly 
increased in China.  One reason may be the reported efforts of Chinese local 
governments in promoting commerce and providing supportive public 
services.
2   In this environment, the country has had to deal increasingly with 
the question of a private tax base to support these public services.  
Economists have long studied the impact of real estate taxes on development 
and other economic activity.  Tax on real estate, which we define as land and 
improvements permanently attached to the land, has not been an issue in 
recent decades in mainland China, where the government has been the legal 
owner of all land since 1949.  The state also owned most urban housing from 
the early 1950s until the early 1980s, and continues to own a substantial 
portion of the stock of residential and commercial buildings.   
 
Advantages the government realizes through its ownership of land include 
the capture of all land value appreciation, the ease of determining land uses, 
and the ability to control (or perhaps to ignore) perceptions of land price 
changes during periods of economic turmoil.  Disadvantages include the 
inefficient use of land (empirical studies in western countries have shown that 
land use decisions are less efficient when made by government than when 
determined in a free market), possible corruption of officials who control land 
use, and the potential for the state to receive less financial benefit than the tax 
revenues that private ownership would produce.  Perhaps more importantly, 
state ownership of all land, and of a major share of the country’s housing, 
leads to diminished housing development and to financial burdens on the 
government (in the form of maintenance costs, in addition to the foregone tax 
revenues). 
 
Although improved property is becoming increasingly privatized as part of 
China’s economic reform process, land transactions remain highly regulated 
by the government.  For example, what a land buyer purchases is the right to 
use land for up to 100 years, so while individuals are encouraged to own their 
homes, they have no true ownership rights in the land beneath.
3  China 
currently raises money for government use primarily by taxing things other 
than real estate, through value-added taxes and income taxes (which are 
levied on both privately and government owned enterprises), with 
administration directed at the national level but much discretion on the part of 
local government officials.
4  Since 1994, China has moved toward greater 
                                                 
2 Berkowitz and Li, p. 370. 
3 Discussions and observations in China indicate that a buyer basically obtains a long-term 
lease; the dwelling occupant “buys” the right to use the land for 75 to 100 years, but the 
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decentralization in administering these taxes, with the national government 
providing guidelines for local governments to follow but with little sharing of 
tax bases across jurisdictions (whereas Russia’s movement toward market 
economics has been plagued by greater tax authority at the national level and 
taxation of the same tax bases by multiple jurisdictions).
5  Real estate has 
served as a tax base in China mainly through a value-added tax on land (rental 
values), a property transaction tax, and a tax on rental revenue.  
 
China’s economic reform initiatives provide an interesting opportunity to 
institute the type of ad valorem real estate taxation  seen in developed 
countries.  The desire for a strong economy opens the door to a timely, 
productive debate on policies that will best serve the long-term interests of 
the country’s citizens.  Now may be an especially productive time for a debate 
on tax policy; even the more developed economies’ systems of generating 
taxes in support of local government functions were not designed for today’s 
world of mobile capital, global trade, and electronic commerce.
6  In China’s 
case, the change from a controlled to a market economy provides a “blank 
slate” on which to craft tax policies.  Unlike areas with long traditions of 
taxation on privately owned real estate, Chinese regions would not face the 
administrative or resource allocation costs that would accompany a change in 
long-standing tax procedures.   
 
In fact, because of the country’s vast size (in terms of both population and 
geography), China presents a potential laboratory for experimenting with 
differing tax regimes, in order to evaluate plans for China in particular and for 
government revenue generation in general.  This type of experimentation may 
be particularly well-suited to China, which has a history of creativity in 
invention, the arts, trade, and even collecting taxes.  For example, the 
medieval Ming dynasty implemented the li-chia system, organized around 
groups of 110 households (li), each of which was broken into 10-household 
subgroups (chia).  The largest and wealthiest ten households in a li each 
spent a year administering the system and providing public services, until a 
new census was taken after ten years.
7       
 
 
Ideologies of Real Estate Ownership and Taxation in China 
 
Early in the 20
th century, Dr. Sun Zhongshan (Yisian) [known to Westerners 
as Sun Yat-sen] tried to promote his idea, derived from 19
th century New York 
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political reformer and self-taught economist Henry George, of taxing land but 
not the value of improvements.  George felt that taxing land alone would 
provide incentives for owners to put land to its most productive use, and 
would eliminate inefficiencies in land markets.
8  This “single tax” could, in Dr. 
Sun’s view, open the door for China to become the richest nation in the 
world.
9  An interesting feature of Dr. Sun’s approach was that the land owner 
should provide the initial assessment of the land’s value, with all subsequent 
appreciation belonging to the state.  The advantages, according to Dr. Sun, 
would include taxing the rich more heavily than the poor, providing ample 
financial resources for the state, enhancing housing a ffordability, and 
avoiding the dramatic land price increases he had observed in such places as 
New York and Paris.  He was troubled by unfairness in the system of land 
taxation that existed in China a century ago, in which taxes were based on 
acreage rather than value, often leaving poor farmers in remote areas more 
heavily taxed than wealthy urbanites.  Dr. Sun’s approach to real estate 
taxation was part of a wider plan to achieve a fairer distribution of land 
ownership in the country.
10   
 
During the long period of government real estate ownership, all land use 
decisions and all development activity were under government control; as a 
result, there was no explicit price paid in a transaction.  Under these 
conditions, all property value appreciation belonged to the government, and 
all property taxes were implicit (the government did not levy taxes on itself).  
Since the mid 1980s, as noted earlier, an authorized private user has been able 
to rent land for up to 100 years.  But following the housing privatization 
initiatives of the early 1980s, the government started levying an income tax on 
housing’s rental revenue; by the mid 1990s, property owners in the nascent 
rental housing industry were paying 37% to 60% of their rental income to the 
government.
11  The value-added tax on land’s rental value was first instituted 
in 1994.  Of course, China’s government needs stable revenue sources, but 
many observers feel that its taxes and fees are too many in number and too 
great in value.  On rental housing in Beijing, for example, taxes and fees 
account for about 30.7% of rental income for individual owners and about 
45.2% for rental companies.  These levies include 12% property tax; 5.5% 
operating tax; and 33% in land usage tax, individual or company income tax, 
and various other fees.  Income tax related to real estate ownership is 
particularly burdensome, in that it is assessed against gross revenue, with no 
                                                 
8 Ladd, p. 1. 
9 Guo Fu Quan Ji (Complete Collection of Father of the Nation), Volume II, 215 – 216. 
Party History Committee, Central Committee of Guo Min Dang of China, August 1982.  
10 Dr. Sun, 1912. 
11 For a discussion of housing reform in China, see Gu and Colwell (1997) and Gu and 
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deduction for depreciation and maintenance. 
 
Some Economic Aspects of Property Taxation 
 
Across the globe, taxes  on real estate have come to provide significant 
financial resources to the governmental entities that collect them.  In market 
economies, the taxes are determined through legislation, and are levied 
explicitly.  The situation is quite different in economies that are centrally 
controlled; because the governments under such regimes own the land, the 
taxes must be levied implicitly.  Yet even though the taxes are not levied 
directly, they nonetheless have well-recognized negative effects on land 
development and property transactions.  These effects include distorted 
resource allocations, less development than would be optimal, and the 
potential for corruption.  Conflicts arise because economists’ prescriptions 
for minimizing these negative effects can interfere with governments’ desires 
to maximize tax revenues.   
 
In fact, because real estate taxes can interfere with economic incentives, some 
communities have implemented preferential tax treatment for favored land 
uses.  For example, farm land (especially land s uitable for commercial 
development) in the United States is often taxed under procedures that 
provide financial benefits to the land owners.  Other favorable tax treatment is 
given for development expected to create economic benefits or improve 
blighted “enterprise zone” areas.
12  Because of the controversies, it should 
come as no surprise that ad valorem real estate taxation receives both praise 
and criticism.  A desirable aspect of real estate taxation is that it pays for 
public services at the local level, which is generally seen as being more 
responsive to citizens than is a higher level of government.  Perhaps more 
importantly, ad valorem taxation can signal a community when inappropriate 
land uses have been permitted (as when a noxious use reduces values – and 
taxes – on nearby properties, and thus pushes more of the aggregate tax 
burden onto others in the jurisdiction).   
 
An undesirable aspect of real estate taxation is that local jurisdictions often 
overlap, so that, for example, a desired cost/benefit package from the city 
might not be accompanied by a desired cost/benefit package from the school 
district that serves the city’s residents.
13  One possible alternative to levying 
taxes on a selected tax base is to charge fees for the receipt of specific 
government services.  However, while such fees can be effective when used 
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to pay for water or for trash removal, they work poorly in paying for the 
maintenance of public facilities or for police protection,
14 as a result of 
potential “free rider” problems. 
 
It is not clear whether a tax on real estate is regressive or progressive in 
nature.  Some view real estate taxes as regressive; a reason is that the value of 
a particular real estate asset may bear little relationship to the owner’s overall 
wealth or income.  While one argument holds that property tax is generally 
regressive, in that even low-income individuals must have some minimal level 
of housing, another holds that property tax is a levy that can not be avoided, 
and that reduces the rate of return on capital, and thus is proportional (or 
even progressive) to the extent that wealthier individuals own more capital.
15 
 
A feature to be encouraged in any tax regime is the minimization of the cost 
and inconvenience of tax administration.  One recent article demonstrated that 
Pareto improvements could be realized if traditional taxation (in an income tax 
context) were administered through a two-round regime coupling voluntary 
compliance with compulsory collections (when the latter are needed).  This 
system would work if the administrator were empowered to impose 
sufficiently severe fines on individuals who evaded taxes.  Specifically, each 
taxpayer would voluntarily submit payment for his or her appropriate share of 
the targeted public budget.  The government could refund all the voluntary 
payments if the targeted goal (based on the aggregate tax base and a 
specified rate) were not met.  After this refunding, a second round of taxation 
would occur under traditional administrative procedures; each taxpayer would 
have to pay his or her appropriate share of the targeted public budget, plus a 
share of the high administrative costs, plus a heavy fine for underpayment.  
In fact, the amount that knowledgeable taxpayers would willingly pay, 
collectively, would exceed the  total expected revenue that a traditional tax 
system would generate.
16  While the situation modeled did not involve real 
estate taxation, the outcome offers support for the intuition that a tax system 
that is costly to administer is not well designed.              
 
At least some form of real estate based tax is likely to become a major provider 
of revenues for at least some levels of government in China as the country 
increasingly adopts features of a modern market economy.  All 50 of the 
United States make use of some type of property tax; this form of taxation 
historically has been the largest provider of revenues for local government 
activities, especially schools.  Although the property tax has at times 
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included levies on individuals’ personal property items, in modern times taxes 
based on property values in the US tend to have been applied primarily to real 




Is the Land Tax a Viable Choice? 
 
Locally-administered ad valorem real estate taxation in the United States 
typically has, as its tax base, the total value of the property: land plus 
buildings.  In most instances, the value of the land is taxed at the same rate as 
is the value of improvements (and there are no current US applications of a 
land-only tax).  However, an exception to this general rule is the graded tax, 
with the value of land taxed more heavily than is the value of constructed 
improvements.  The graded tax is used by some jurisdictions in the state of 
Pennsylvania,
18 although the only major city to tax l and and structures 
differently is Pittsburgh.
19  Pittsburgh implemented a plan in 1978 that has led 
to the lowering of the tax rate applied to improvements and the increasing of 
the tax rate applied to land;
20 the rate applied to structures ultimately came to 
be more than five times the rate on land.
21  Although Pittsburgh realized 
tremendous growth in development activity after the implementation of the 
system of taxing land more heavily, factors other than the tax (including a 
major urban renewal program) may have played important roles.
22  Indeed, it is 
interesting that Pennsylvania, the state that makes heaviest use of (graded) 
land taxation, is also the state in which local governments make the heaviest 
use of income taxes.
23 
 
A neutral tax is one that does not affect resource allocations in terms of total 
                                                 
17 Ladd, p. 4. 
18 Sixteen cities in Pennsylvania employ graded systems; see Brunori, p. 549.  In addition 
to Pittsburgh, these include Allentown, Harrisburg, and Washington; see  Incentive 
Taxation, March 1998, p. 3.  The state of Idaho also has a $50,000 residential 
improvements exclusion that has the effect of a graded system; see Incentive Taxation, 
March 1998, p. 4.    
19 A form of the land tax is used in Jamaica, Slovenia, and Estonia, and land tax has been 
discussed in the Czech Republic and Latvia.  Other instances of graded systems that tax 
land more heavily than structures can be seen in Australia (especially the state of 
Victoria), Canada, and South Africa as well.  See Brueckner, p. 49; Oates and Schwab, p. 
19; and Incentive Taxation, November 1998 p. 2 and July 1999 p. 1. 
20 Bourassa, p. 45. 
21 Oates and Schwab, p. 1. 
22 Oates and Schwab, p. 2. 
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quantities, although there can be distributional effects.
24  One type of tax that 
is often said to be “incentive-neutral” is the tax truly levied on land value 
alone.  Indeed, those who follow the teachings of Henry George view the land 
tax as one that not only is incentive-neutral (in that it does not provide 
incentives to over- or under-invest in improvements, although we might 
question whether it would affect the sizes of parcels selected for particular 
uses), but that also should generate sufficient revenues to provide for the 
payment of all government expenses – hence George’s view of the land tax as 
the “single tax.”
25  Supporters of land taxes (who might recommend taxing 
land alone, or might instead prefer a graded system with land taxed at a rate 
higher than improvements) also see them as more fair than improvements-
based taxes, because land is fixed in supply, such that its value derives from 
natural occurrences, and from population and public investment activities to 
which the land owner did not contribute.
26  Under typical market conditions 
the land owner can not avoid paying the tax even by selling the land, because 
the expectation of future tax payments is capitalized into a lower transaction 
price.
27  We might also note that a land tax can be less intrusive than is a tax 
based in any part on improvements value, in that the latter typically requires 
assessment personnel to physically enter the improvements at selected times 
to verify the existence or condition of various property features.  
 
While the idea of taxing land is often called the “Georgist” approach, land 
taxation’s roots can be found in the works of earlier economists, including 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill.
28  Land tax proponents, in 
general, believe that the supply of land is perfectly elastic, such that allowing 
the government to capture land’s full value through a tax will have no impact 
on land owners’ development decisions.  The so-called Georgist view (that 
the owner is required to pay tax because others are prevented from using the 
land) is contrasted with the “Tiebout” view (that an owner is required to pay 
tax in return for public benefits received, and as a result selects land in an area 
where the tax/benefit mix is attractive).   
 
                                                 
24 Mills, p. 125. 
25 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 9, p. 153.  George actually called for a 100% 
tax on land rents, which would be fundamentally equivalent to government ownership of 
land.  For this tax to be efficient, there would have to be economies of scale in providing 
public services; see Ladd, p. 30.   
26  Some economists argue that a tax on periodic land rents is incentive-neutral, whereas a 
tax on land values may cause distortions by motivating a land owner to develop sooner 
than would otherwise be appropriate unless the value were assessed at the land’s highest 
and best use; see Ladd, p. 26, 27.  
27 Ladd, p. 25, 26. 
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Some who encourage land taxation see benefits that can be classified into two 
categories: liquidity and incentive effects.  The liquidity issue is that if land is 
taxed without regard to the nature or intensity of its use, the owner of land 
left vacant or underdeveloped will lack the liquidity to pay the tax.  The 
incentive issue relates to a reduction in the cost of holding improvements, 
and therefore a lowering of the supply curve for buildings (whereas the 
supply of land, if we view it as fixed, is not affected by production or holding 
costs, including taxes).
29  Another way of addressing this issue is to expect 
the derived demand for land to increase substantially as untaxed 
improvements’ values rise, leaving land values high enough to generate 
substantial tax revenues.
30  Land taxation is said to be efficient, in that 
societal resources are not wasted through owners’ failure to maintain 
buildings out of fear of having their assessed values (and taxes) increased.  
One study has found that a  revenue-neutral land tax results in greater 
investment in improvements than does an equal amount of tax raised on both 
land and structures.
31  Land tax supporters feel that if buildings are not taxed, 
a developer will strive to achieve a capital-to-land ratio that equates the 
marginal product of capital to the cost of capital.  In the presence of a tax on 
buildings, however, the capital-to-land ratio will be lower, such that the 
marginal product of capital is equated to the cost of capital plus the tax rate.  
Therefore, if taxing land allows for reducing or eliminating the tax on 
improvements, taxing land alone (or at least more heavily) is said to bring 
about more intensive development.
32   
 
Taxing land alone is also defended as a fairer approach than typical ad 
valorem taxation, in that an increase in land’s value results largely from 
actions of the public or of other investors, and thus the added tax results from 
what has been largely a windfall for the fortunate owner.
33  Supporters of the 
land tax feel that the revenue-generating and fairness benefits are further 
enhanced by the ease of administering a tax system in which the tax base can 
not be hidden, and payment can not be evaded.
34  Some even see land 
taxation as providing revenue stabilization across economic cycles.
35   
 
                                                 
29 Bourassa, p. 46. 
30 A view offered by economist Thomas Nechyba, noted in Netzer, p. 2. 
31 Brueckner, p. 56. 
32 Oates and Schwab (1998), p. 135; Oates and Schwab (1997), p. 3.  A similar 
observation is offered in Brueckner, p. 51. 
33 Ladd, p. 25. 
34 Netzer, p. 2.  One observer has noted that Cook County, Illinois (Chicago) employs 
only 18 appraisers to assess land values but needs 133 appraisers to assess building values.  
See The Illinois Georgist, Summer 1998, p. 3.    
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Yet there can be serious problems with a land tax regime.  Indeed, the “single 
tax” based on self-assessment presents some disadvantages that Dr. Sun did 
not mention.  These disadvantages include the potential for black markets to 
develop, or for collusion to occur in land transactions; the possibility that the 
state would not receive the benefit of the appreciation and the accompanying 
additional tax revenue; the chance that the government would have to spend 
more resources monitoring land transactions; and the possibility that buyers’ 
need to make secret side payments to land owners would reduce the number 
of people who could afford to buy homes or other private real estate.  Indeed, 
a number of recent studies have raised questions on whether the land tax 
offers the benefits, in terms of efficiency and other desired outcomes, that its 
proponents claim.  Foremost among concerns cited in recent works is that 
taxing land without regard to its use can cause an owner to hastily develop to 
a use that is not the most efficient.
36  Stated differently, arguments that favor 
land taxation are less convincing when seen in an intertemporal context.  
Because land’s market value reflects economic benefits that may not be 
expected for years to come, a tax on land’s value can result in taxation prior to 
the receipt of revenues.  Efficiency can be impeded as a result, with land 
inefficiently directed away from uses (forestry, construction) with long 
development times.
37  Even treating the supply of land as perfectly elastic is 
questionable, in that the supply suitable for specific uses depends on other 
development that has taken place (although the analysis typically focuses on 
a small municipal area, where the supply of land is more appropriately seen as 
being truly fixed).     
 
Other issues involve the difficulty of administering a land taxation scheme.  
For example, how is the land to be assessed for taxing purposes?  If the tax is 
to be neutral with respect to revenue generation, the tax base must be the 
current rent that could be charged for using the land, rather than the current 
market value.  If the tax is to be neutral with respect to the timing of 
development decisions, however, the land must be assessed based on its 
highest and best use, rather than its actual current use.
38  The choice of a 
benchmark can have both economic and political impacts; if an owner can 
change the tax by selecting a particular land use, then the tax regime is not 
neutral.
39  At the same time, taxing vacant land at a zero rate would be 
politically controversial, since the result might appear to favor speculation.
40  
Another issue is the small amount of revenue that would result from taxing 
                                                 
36  Oates and Schwab, p. 3. 
37  Bentick, p. 860. 
38  These issues are discussed in Ladd. 
39  Tideman, p. 110. 
40  This example is cited in Bentick, p. 867. 152 Gu and Trefzger 
   
only the value of land, even if the rate were to be relatively high.
41  Yet 
another problem with the Georgist view is that the supposed benefits of 
financing public services with the land tax alone may not materialize when the 
public goods are subject to congestion and do not exhibit appropriate 
economies of scale, or when residents have little ability to move among 
jurisdictions.
42  A final point of concern is that if the government effectively 
owns all land and therefore gains the full financial benefit of increases – or 
suffers the full detriment of decreases  – in land value through taxation, 
owners of homes and other private property have less incentive to work 
together toward solving problems, such as crime, that require collective effort 
within a local area. 
 
 
Other Issues Affecting Property Tax Policy 
 
In devising a policy recommendation, we must consider several aspects of the 
economics of property taxation.  In doing so, we can place only limited 
reliance on past studies.  Research on real estate taxation has tended to focus 
on perceived benefits of switching from a land-plus-improvements tax to a 
land tax, not on the creation of a tax system where no closely similar system 
has existed before.  Earlier studies also are based on various restrictive 
underlying assumptions,
43 and usually are based on metropolitan areas, not 
entire countries.  Therefore, logic and common sense may be more helpful to 
us in recommending a course of action than is empirical evidence.  
 
One issue to address is that of tax incidence; suppliers and demanders of real 
estate services share any tax burden based on their relative price elasticities.  
Taxes, in general, make prices higher for users and costs higher for suppliers, 
thereby reducing the equilibrium quantity (of whatever is taxed) in the market.  
An unreasonably high tax will depress development of the tax base, and 
eventually reduce the tax revenue collected by the government over the long 
term.  Another issue is the incentives created by a tax regime; as noted, some 
types of taxation are not incentive-neutral, in that they do affect economic 
activity.
44  For example, a higher tax on measured income causes people to 
work less, hide income from tax authorities, or direct their efforts to legally 
untaxed endeavors; a higher tax on motor fuels provides an incentive for 
drivers to travel fewer miles or drive more fuel-efficient vehicles.  Of course, 
                                                 
41  This concern has been raised by economist Edwin Mills, as cited in Netzer, p. 2. 
42  Ladd, p. 29, 30. 
43 See, for example, Wildasin, p. 105.  
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we must consider the entire package of tax costs and benefits across 
jurisdictions when measuring the incentive effects of various tax regimes.  For 
example, while many observers feel that a tax on improved real estate causes 
developers to develop less intensively than the level that would be most 
efficient for society, the federal income tax benefits accruing to both 
residential and income real estate in the United States mitigate the 
disincentives of a local improvements tax.  Another issue is the balancing of 
fairness with efficiency.  One fairness element of real estate taxes is that real 
estate can not be shielded from the tax authorities in the manner that valuable 
personal property is often hidden, so it is unlikely that anyone could illegally 
evade a real estate tax (though some observers believe that those with 
political power use their influence to hold their assessments in check). 
 
Another issue is the competition among jurisdictions.  Tax planning in the 
United States i s complicated by the fact that there are more than 80,000 
individual taxing jurisdictions,
45 and their individual taxing activities may lead 
to confusing outcomes for citizens and analysts alike.    For example, citizens 
in the city of Pittsburgh also pay ad valorem taxes to jurisdictions such as the 
county and the school district, which do not use the graded system that the 
city employs.
46  If multiple independent jurisdictions are levying taxes on the 
same tax base, a “tragedy of the commons” can occur, in which the tax base is 
so over-taxed that it is ultimately destroyed, as reinvestment is insufficient to 
replace what is lost through depreciation.  A result is likely to be an ultimate 
reduction in tax collections that leaves the taxing jurisdictions poorly 
equipped to provide public services.
47  
 
In fact, the existence of differing policies in different jurisdictions raises the 
more fundamental question of the efficacy of real estate taxation.  In recent 
years, taxing bodies across the US have come to rely less and less on the 
property tax; between 1970 and 1994 twenty-one states decreased their 
reliance on property taxes by more than 10%,
48 with severe legal restrictions 
on property taxation having been placed in four states (California, Colorado, 
Montana, a nd Oregon) and legislated caps on tax rates or other revenue 
measures common in many others.
49  In fact, throughout the 20
th century the 
importance of property tax has fallen in the US, with property taxation’s 
proportion of local government funding having peaked in the 1930s and fallen 
since then.
50   
                                                 
45 Brunori, p. 547. 
46 Bourassa, p. 45. 
47 Berkowitz and Li, p. 371. 
48 Brunori, p. 544. 
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States, counties, cities, and school districts are not the only types of 
jurisdictions that use tax policies to compete for economic activity.  An issue 
that has come to concern policy analysts in recent years is tax competition 
among countries.  Both the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the European Union have issued guidelines to 
prevent what they see as unfair competition in the tax arena, such as offering 
preferential tax treatment to selected activities or constituents as a means of 
attracting desired economic outcomes.
51  While these guidelines do not have 
the power of international law, they do signal concerns that China would be 
wise to heed, especially if its political leaders anticipate seeking economic 
assistance from international bodies. 
 
After considering the government’s need for revenue, the country’s 
traditions (and its economic and political situation), and what is known 
theoretically and empirically about different taxing schemes, we have come to 
see several disadvantages in China’s existing system of imposing fees and 
taxes relating to real estate: 
 
•  it charges fees before an operation has begun generating revenues, 
hence making it difficult for people to start businesses;  
•  it levies taxes based on gross rental revenues without allowing 
deductions for depreciation and maintenance costs, hence discouraging 
existing businesses;  
•  it discourages entrepreneurs from taking the risks of providing housing 
services;   
•  it increases prices and rents to consumers, thereby depressing demand 
for owned and rental housing; and 
•  it is accompanied by very high administrative costs, because every 
different government agency must keep records of the same property 
(and its owner) and do the bookkeeping in connection with collecting 
taxes or fees.   
 
 
A Policy Recommendation 
 
We recommend that China work to develop a system of real estate taxation 
based on total property income (which must be an imputed income in the case 
of owner-occupied  housing or business property), after allowance for 
depreciation and maintenance costs.  The continued existence of active rental 
markets should facilitate the estimation of the imputed rental value of owner-
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provided real estate services.  The tax should be administered by a single 
jurisdiction, presumably at a high level of government.  (A recent study based 
on information from China and Russia indicates that both tax collections and 
economic activity benefit from a lower number of taxing jurisdictions; indeed, 
too many taxing entities can result in economic stagnation as low net tax 
revenues, after allowing for collection costs, impede public services and much 
commercial activity is driven “underground.”
52)  This type of administration is 
consistent with recent trends in the administration of China’s income and 
value-added taxes. 
 
We do not suggest a land tax, or even a graded system, because of the 
administrative difficulties and other problems of land taxation, as discussed 
earlier.  In addition, we do not recommend taxing housing at a lower rate than 
other capital improvements (aside from the possible need for a practically-
driven exemption for lower valued residences).  While taxing housing at a 
lower rate than other structures benefits housing, it might also lead to the 
construction of larger housing units, thereby crowding out other capital 
spending, such as that needed in building the country’s commercial base 
(although taxes on homes owned by the non-affluent might have to be 
phased in as the economy strengthens).  This single income-based taxation of 
real estate would encourage more entrepreneurs to enter the housing market, 
because  
 
•  it would make starting rental businesses easier, in that the initiators of 
such enterprises would not have to register w ith, and pay fees to, 
various levels of administration before beginning their operations;  
•  it would allow marginal entrepreneurs to operate housing businesses, 
thereby making the industry larger than under the current fee/tax system 
(since they would pay tax only when they made profits);  
•  it would eliminate transfer fees that might prevent transactions, and 
thereby might prevent properties from moving from lower-valued to 
higher-valued uses; and  
•  it would reduce administrative costs, since the government would 
eliminate all the “in-between” fee collectors. 
 
Relative to the current system, this type of tax would be efficiency-enhancing 
in a Kaldor sense, with gains to winners exceeding losses to losers (though 
not necessarily in a Pareto sense, since we have no way to know how the 
distribution of those who pay taxes or fees under the current system 
correlates with the distribution of those who would be taxed under a system 
of real estate taxation, although if the two lists were identical the change 
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might be Pareto-efficient as well).  The value to the taxing authority of the 
change from a system of various taxes and fees to one of real estate taxation 
can be represented with the following simple equation: 
 
(BaseRE x RateRE – AdmRE) – (BaseCUR x RateCUR – AdmCUR),  (1) 
 
where BaseRE is the tax base for a real estate tax, RateRE is the tax rate applied 
to net operating income on real estate, Adm RE is the cost of administering a 
system of real estate taxation, BaseCUR is the weighted average value of items 
(revenues or activities) taxed or otherwise charged for under the current 
system, RateCUR is the weighted average of the tax or fee rates levied under 
the current system, and Adm CUR  is the cost of administering the current 
fee/tax system.  The change is desirable if the equation’s value exceeds zero.   
 
Because we assume that Adm CUR > Adm RE, we find that the change should be 
valuable to the public even if the aggregate value of real estate net operating 
income (actual and imputed) is equal to the value of items currently taxed, 
and/or if the tax rate applied to real estate income is equal to the average rate 
of tax/charge under the current system.  However, we also assume that the 
rate applied to real estate net operating income will be much less than the 
average rate applied to taxed activities under the current system; otherwise, 
some of the benefits discussed above might not be realized.  It is not clear 
whether BaseRE > BaseCUR; it is possible that, at least initially, BaseCUR will 
exceed BaseRE, perhaps by a sizable margin, because the current system is 
based on so many diverse values and activities.  (One source of uncertainty 
is the degree to which lower-valued residences would be exempted from the 
real estate tax.)  However, over time, we would expect BaseRE to grow 
considerably (even if not to a level exceeding BaseCUR) as property values 
rise, through strong market activity and the movement of properties to higher-
valued uses.  It is clear that if BaseCUR > BaseRE, and especially if this 
relationship persists  over the long run, then the administrative savings 
(Adm CUR – Adm RE) must be considerable for the change to result in greater net 
tax revenue in the presence of a lower tax rate.  Of course, a greatly simplified 
system should result in significant administrative savings and, as noted, the 
value of the tax base should rise as a better tax system and other market 
improvements take hold.               
 
A more creative alternative with the same general structure would be to base 
the tax on a property’s total market value rather than its net operating income.  
This approach would allow for self-assessment of value, as once 
recommended by Dr. Sun.  As have more recent writers on the topic,
53 Dr. Sun 
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recognized that self-assessment would have to be accompanied by some form 
of eminent domain system based on the self-assessed value.  Otherwise, each 
property owner would have incentives to state a lower value in order to pay 
lower taxes, with no accompanying penalty.  In other words, under such a 
system, the owner’s assessed value would also serve as a basis for the price 
at which the owner would be obligated to sell the property to the government 
(or even to an interested private party).  Creating a system in which the owner 
can state a true reservation price would be all but impossible in a place with 
an established tax system (such as the US), but it might be achieved in China, 
where private ownership is not yet widespread, and where established and 
politically powerful tax bureaucracies would not have to be dismantled and 
replaced.  Indeed, the size and diversity of China might easily accommodate 
trials with both systems in different regions, even though such 
experimentation would bring added administrative costs.  Because of the 
important implications that such a system could have for land use, 
government administration, and property rights, China might offer itself as a 
dynamic laboratory for a limited number of real estate tax systems, with 
financial assistance provided by other countries, or even by private 
organizations, that could benefit from the knowledge thereby generated.      
Our suggested policy, if adopted, would offer benefits to the evolving 
Chinese private real estate markets and the broader economy.  It could serve 
to minimize depressing effects on real estate development, in order to provide 
a growing base, and growing sources, for taxation (consider that a fairly low 
percentage tax on rental property owners’ net operating incomes, instead of 
their gross rental revenues, would encourage housing development and, in 
the long run, increase tax revenue to the government).  This result would 
buttress the government’s demonstrated desire to provide good public 
services in support of a growing economy; indeed, the wish to provide 
supportive services gives the Chinese government incentives to adopt a tax 
system that is designed and administered for efficiency.  Of course, while 
providing proper services is essential in a Tiebout sense (studies suggest 
that property taxes absent good roads and other public services stifle not 
only real estate activity, but economic growth more generally), simply adding 
a real estate levy on top of the current tax system would serve only to 
decrease the rate of return on a real estate investment, thus reducing activity 
in the private  market.
54  Replacing the current cumbersome system, and 
keeping the burden on households (and commercial enterprises, as well) at a 
reasonable level, while recognizing private property rights and providing 
adequate public services, should promote the kind of economic activity that 
would maximize what the government could collect in taxes over the long run, 
and should minimize questions over shifting or other tax incidence concerns.  
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Finally, a broad-based tax that is not too dissimilar to those levied in other 
countries would be unlikely to raise concerns among international political 
organizations over inappropriate competition. 
 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
The ability to raise tax revenue is a great motivator in the formulation of 
government policies.  Real estate related taxes can be particularly effective 
generators of government revenues.  In the United States, for example, 
property taxes accounted for more than 79% of local tax revenues in the 1965 
– 1991 period (although their share of total tax revenues has fallen).  In 1991, 
the per-capita property tax in each of five states (New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Alaska, Connecticut, and New York) was well above $1,000.  In addition to the 
ad valorem tax, a governmental unit can levy taxes on capital appreciation and 
rental income.  When we consider that China’s urban population is 300 million 
and growing, we can see the tremendous potential for healthy growth in real 
estate values and, in turn, for impressive growth in real estate related tax 
revenues.  Both the national government and lower governmental units can 
be expected to look toward real estate-related taxes to fund public 
expenditures as China’s private markets develop.   
 
Yet at the same time, tax payments are a considerable burden to property 
owners, especially if they face severe levies on other tax bases (income, 
transactions) as well.  In the US, property taxes account for more than 4% of 
per capita income, on average.  In China, where the general lack of housing 
affordability remains a major obstacle to housing privatization, it might be 
impractical to levy a property tax on owners of lower-tier dwelling units any 
time in the near future (a tax on “luxury” houses and apartments could be 
implemented as an initial step).  But the burdensome system of taxes and fees 
that currently applies to rental income in Chinese cities has severely impeded 
the development of a private rental housing industry, and has slowed the 
housing privatization process.  Lower income people can not afford the high 
rents, while the owners of rental housing can not make profits.  At the same 
time, the Chinese government is facing the problem of a huge and increasing 
number of vacant new residential buildings.  There were 70,380,000 square 
meters of vacant residential buildings awaiting sale in 1997, and the vacancy 
rate has remained high (at 25% in 1997, 27.3% in 1998, and 20.2% in 1999).  
Obviously, the government can not receive much tax revenue from a weak 
industry struggling to gain a foothold.  While any policy adopted must walk 
the fine line between raising current revenue and harming long-term 
incentives, applying a relatively low rate to a reasonably comprehensive base 
offers a chance to succeed where the current policy has created barriers.  Real Estate Related Taxation in China 159 
 
 
An obvious limitation of the foregoing discussion is that we can offer no 
empirical tests, or even any specific examples of applications of these ideas in 
jurisdictions within China; private land ownership and the defense of private 
property rights remain fairly new ideas in the world’s most populous country.  
We look forward to a day when we, or others, can build on this admittedly 
descriptive analysis in a more systematic way, based on the qualitative and 
quantitative information that is sure to emerge as China’s real estate and 
other private markets continue to develop.  In conclusion, our suggested 
policy – replacing the current complicated system of taxes and fees with 
centrally-administered taxation at a low rate on rental (actual or imputed) or 
asset values – would increase operating efficiency, reduce prices and rents to 
consumers, and, as a result, stimulate the growth of the housing industry and 
the broader economy.  Taxing too heavily would encumber the growth of the 
industry and reduce the government’s ability to collect tax revenues in the 
long run.  But a faster growing housing market and housing industry would 
provide a solid, verifiable tax base and greater tax revenues to the 
government.   
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